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Market Forces in Domestic Adoptions:  
Advocating a Quantitative Limit on Private 
Agency Adoption Fees 
Jack Darcher 
INTRODUCTION 
Since at least the early 1970s, there has been a widening gap in the 
United States between the number of prospective adoptive parents and the 
relatively diminishing supply of children eligible for adoption. As detailed 
later in this article, adoption (as a form of family formation) continues to 
expand in terms of popularity and availability. This increased availability 
comes from both the creation of new forms of adoption, such as open 
adoption, and from the qualification of new categories of adoptive parents, 
such as single adults and gay couples. Due to these factors and the expected 
permanence of reproductive rights, this gap is likely to persist and expand 
into the twenty-first century. 
Regardless of the various avenues of placement that adoptive parents 
pursue, market forces exist within the adoption process. While observers 
might rightfully feel uncomfortable speaking about adoption in financial 
terms, the influence of adoptive parents’ desires and preferences on the 
adoption market requires that market forces be recognized and discussed. 
Only within the last quarter century has legislation been enacted that has 
effectively influenced this market behavior. However, with the exception of 
statutes targeting black-market adoption, these measures have never 
intentionally confronted the economics of the adoption market. Meanwhile, 
social and legal commentators have taken a great interest in the market 
forces of adoption. Key amongst these commentators is Judge Richard 
Posner, who has advocated a system of free-market adoption. While the 
idea of a legal free market for adoption has existed for some time, its 
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benefits have rarely been seriously contemplated. And although the human 
costs of such a deregulated market prevent its realization, its benefits 
warrant a discussion on the role of legislation in influencing adoption 
market behavior. 
This article begins by exploring the social and cultural forces that have 
contributed to the adoption crunch. Then, after surveying the various 
available avenues for adoption, this article will give background 
information about the market forces in adoption and the competing 
philosophical views on these forces. Next, the article will cover past and 
present measures that have influenced both market forces and market 
behavior. Finally, the article will make proposals for additional steps, while 
acknowledging their flaws.  
Ultimately, this article seeks to establish that adoption regulation must be 
crafted to modify adoption market behavior for maximum societal wealth, 
while taking every effort to protect the personhood interests of the adoptee. 
This article appraises two possible avenues toward this goal, each of them 
embracing the economic aspects of adoptions while striving to divert 
adoption away from “grey-market” independent adoption and into more 
regulated and humane adoption formats. The first possibility, the 
federalization of adoption, is fraught with constitutional obstacles. While 
this approach might become more feasible as international adoption 
becomes more prevalent, and thus requires a more uniform national 
approach to adoption, it also suffers from the morally and politically 
distasteful necessity of justifying the federalization of adoption under the 
purview of the Constitution’s Commerce Clause.1 As discussed later, the 
mere conception of adoption in such market terms could arguably have such 
a dehumanizing effect on the adoption process that it actually threatens the 
public acceptance of the institution of adoption. Given these immense 
obstacles, this approach, in this author’s opinion, is not viable. 
The second proposal is a cap on private agency adoption fees. By 
lowering the overall costs of adoption for those who choose agency 
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adoption, this measure would make agency adoption more attractive than 
independent adoption, having the effect of decreasing the commodification 
of adoption and protecting the personhood of the child. Although burdened 
with several drawbacks, this measure could be instituted at either the federal 
or state level and could be either voluntary or mandatory. In any of these 
forms, a quantitative limit on private agency adoption fees will counteract 
or reverse the destructive effects of market forces in domestic adoption 
while preserving the advantages of agency adoption. Thus, a limit would 
provide many of the benefits of free-market adoption while avoiding its 
critical detriments. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Twentieth Century Adoption Trends 
Some history of adoption’s progression in the twentieth century is 
necessary in order to appreciate the influence and importance of the 
adoption measures that this article will evaluate and promote. Moreover, it 
is important to understand the economic forces currently at play in 
adoption. Of particular importance for this article is the creation of the wide 
gap between the supply and demand for healthy infants that adoption has 
been experiencing for approximately forty years. 
Adoption reached its peak numbers in the United States during the 1960s, 
with over 140,000 adoptions taking place in 1965.2 In remarkable contrast, a 
mere 16,000 adoptions took place in 1938.3 Various explanations have been 
given for this noteworthy increase, the most persuasive being the erosion of 
adoption’s stigma as an illicit and morally questionable institution.4 
Changes in child welfare policies and state adoption laws helped create a 
perception of adoption as a generous and selfless measure, whereas it had 
earlier been perceived as an abnormal practice.5  
A shift in cultural views of genetics also played an important role.6 In the 
first third of the twentieth century, the theory of eugenics had gained 
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significant popularity, creating the idea that orphaned children possessed 
inferior mental and physical traits and, therefore, were not entitled to the 
benefits of a nuclear family.7 However, studies in the 1920s, the creation of 
child welfare advocacy groups, and an overall resistance to the theory of 
eugenics reversed this view of adoptive children, and by the mid-1950s 
prospective parents started outnumbering eligible adoptees.8  
For at least a decade after this point, the number of available adoptees 
continued to grow with the expanding demand; out-of-wedlock births 
soared from 88,000 in 1938 to 201,000 in 1958.9 And due to the increased 
tolerance for illegitimacy, agencies began dealing directly with pregnant 
women and offering services to help them bring their children to term in a 
compassionate atmosphere.10 Also, agencies became less concerned with 
placing adoptees according to their religious, cultural, and racial heritage. 
The adoption of older and handicapped children became more 
commonplace as well.11 
However, the rate of adoptions plummeted after 1970, as agencies began 
experiencing a rapid decrease in the number of available adoptees. Several 
explanations have been given for this result. One commonly identified 
cause is the increased access to contraceptives and abortion following 
seminal Supreme Court decisions.12 While these decisions represented a 
breakthrough for the sexual revolution, their impact on adoption was 
seemingly immediate; from 1970 to 1975, adoptions fell from 89,000 to 
50,000.13 
Additionally, those unwed mothers who did choose to bear children more 
often decided to keep them. In 1973, 20 percent of unwed mothers placed 
their child in adoption; by 1982, this rate dropped to 12 percent.14 The 
availability of contraceptives and abortion now made motherhood a 
conscious choice.15 Also, the social stigma for single mothers was eroding.16 
Judge Richard Posner, whose views of adoption will be focused on later, 
cites this increased retention of unwed children as the leading cause for the 
decline in available adoptees. He suggests that the number of illegitimate 
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births remained steady, but fewer children were being given up for 
adoption.17 
While the supply of adoptive children has been dwindling, the supply of 
potential adoptive parents has been increasing. The ability to adopt, which 
had previously been limited to married heterosexuals, has become 
accessible to unmarried couples, same-sex couples, and single persons 
regardless of sexuality in most states.18 Additionally, despite advances in 
assisted reproduction, the national number of infertile couples increased 
substantially in the latter part of the twentieth century, most likely due to a 
trend to delay childbearing in the baby boomer generation.19 However, the 
increased use of assisted reproduction might actually contribute to a 
lessened demand for adoptees since fewer infertile couples are seeking to 
adopt.20 
Perhaps the strongest indicator of the gap between adoption’s supply and 
its demand is the growth of intercountry adoption in the United States. It 
seems logical to assume that increased availability and access for 
intercountry adoption would decrease the demand for domestic adoptees, 
thereby theoretically reducing domestic adoption fees. Any success in 
reducing adoption fees domestically might also help promote domestic 
adoption over intercountry adoption. However, this possibility confronts 
two obstacles. First, people who seek intercountry adoption often do so 
because of nonmonetary barriers that present themselves in domestic 
adoption, such as barriers some countries have pertaining to age and family 
structure (single or unmarried adoptive parents). Second, there is a question 
as to whether a decrease in adoption costs could persuade a potential 
adoptive parent to change their preferences when it comes to their potential 
child. However, while intercountry adoption feasibly helps relieve domestic 
demand for adoptive children, it is an immense topic that is beyond the 
scope of this article. 
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B. Adoption Avenues 
While adoption has evolved according to various social forces, it has also 
been impacted by economic forces. The imbalance between the supply and 
demand for healthy infants has manifested itself in all aspects of adoption—
from foster care adoption to private independent adoption. Before 
examining the various theories evaluating these economic forces in 
adoption, the three major forms of adoption must be described: public 
adoption (either via foster care or a public adoption agency), private agency 
adoption (including both closed adoption and open adoption, as 
distinguished below), and independent adoption. 
1. Public Adoption 
Public adoption—adoption undertaken solely through state avenues—can 
take one of two forms: foster adoption or public adoption agency. In foster 
adoption, the parental rights of the birth parents have not yet been fully 
terminated; the child is in the custody of the state, but the possibility still 
exists that he or she will be reunited with his or her parents under various 
circumstances. In public agency adoption, the child is still under state 
custody, but parental rights have been fully and unalterably terminated, as 
discussed below. 
The key distinction between public agency adoption and private agency 
adoption is that the latter typically represents adoptions initiated by the 
child’s biological parents, while public adoption represents the adoption of 
children whose parental rights have been acquired by the state or a state-
licensed agency. In public adoption, the child’s availability for adoption 
usually requires that the parental rights of the birth parents have been 
severed prior to any adoption proceeding—a difficult and painful process 
and the source of much delay. Public adoption usually pertains to children 
under state care and is the typical method of adoption for older or special-
needs children.21 These “wards of the state” include both abandoned 
children and children removed from their parents by the state. The former 
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group—abandoned children—may have come into state care by outright 
abandonment, such as children found without identification, or may have 
been handed to the state without legal consequence as the result of safe-
haven laws, which are now present in forty-seven states.22 The growing 
popularity of such laws has increased the number of children flooding into 
foster care.23 
Unlike every other form of adoption, public adoption centers do not lack 
a supply of children. In 2002, roughly 534,000 children were living in foster 
care nationwide, of which roughly 126,000 were eligible for adoption.24 
Currently, as a result of measures which are detailed later in this article, 
public adoption is relatively cost free for adoptive parents. As opposed to 
private agency and independent adoption, public agencies are nonprofit 
organizations and do not charge a fee for placement. The only costs to 
adoptive parents in public adoption usually come from legal fees, which are 
minimal and are often reimbursed by the state. 
The costs of public adoption to states, however, can be immense. These 
costs include the housing and care for foster children under direct state 
supervision and the payment of monthly stipends to foster parents providing 
foster children a temporary living situation. Additionally, states must 
employ hundreds of social workers dedicated to either repairing and 
reuniting broken families or placing those children who cannot return into 
foster homes. Finally, it is important to recognize the variety of other 
administrative and legal costs associated with removing children from 
negligent or abusive situations as well as the costs associated with providing 
them with stable living situations.25 
2. Private Agency Adoption 
Private agency adoption, along with independent adoption, represents the 
placement of children voluntarily given up for adoption by their birth 
parents. Often, this involves the placement of infants and newborns.26 
Private agencies originated as sources of adoptees for specific religious 
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groups or other demographics. Today, agencies may possess a variety of 
philosophical purposes, ranging from a general interest in promoting 
adoption to providing an alternative to the abortion of unplanned 
pregnancies.27 Some private agencies operate as alternatives to state-run 
foster homes. Whatever the purpose, the agency must still adhere to state 
regulations.28  
By and large, these agencies are nonprofit organizations because most 
states expressly prohibit profitable adoption. While children placed in 
private adoption are often quickly matched with potential parents, the 
opposite is true for the parents, who must often wait several years before 
being matched with a child. The application process is likely to include 
complex selection procedures specific to the agency, as well as substantial 
fees for the agency’s services, regardless of whether placement is ultimately 
successful.29 In particular, private agencies are more likely to apply 
traditional conceptions of family when ranking potential parents for 
placement: young, married, and heterosexual applicants are usually given 
preference over older, single, or homosexual counterparts.30 Even if such 
bias is prohibited by the state, private agencies are often capable of 
excluding undesired applicants on pretextual grounds.31 Private agencies 
may also apply stringent race-matching criteria in their adoption 
placements, thereby severely delaying the adoption of children whose race 
does not match that of the agency’s roster of prospective parents (and vice 
versa).32 
While the use of agency fees is now industry-wide, prior to the 1950s, 
such mandatory payment was considered inappropriate.33 At that time, 
agencies subsisted on voluntary donations made by adoptive parents out of 
gratitude to the agencies.34 The introduction of agency fees, and the 
commercialization of adoption in general, raised a multitude of ethical and 
professional concerns.35 Of particular concern was the seeming duality that 
such fees created between the perceived pricelessness of the child and a 
legal arrangement that assigned a monetary value to children.36 Agencies 
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justified the fees by limiting them to compensate the agency’s actual cost 
for the adoption—a claim that is still adhered to today.37 
However, despite this claimed adherence to operational costs, agency 
fees have steadily risen. Estimates in the late 1980s put the average agency 
fee between $7,000 and $10,000.38 By the end of the twentieth century, the 
upper end of the fee range was estimated at $30,000.39 Less than five years 
later, agencies were charging as much as $52,000 for adoption placement, 
and price premiums were available for Caucasian children and expedited 
service.40 
Given this exponential rise in agency fees, much institutional effort has 
been invested into validating this seemingly limitless expense without 
claiming profit-seeking as a justification.41 While agencies advocate for 
these fees as a symbolic expression of parental devotion,42 one possible 
justification could be the need to provide birth mothers with the same 
compensation available through the arena of independent adoption. 
However, this author was unable to find any written evidence of agencies 
using such a market-savvy justification, possibly because of the wariness to 
acknowledge such economic forces within the adoption process. 
3. Independent Adoption 
Independent adoption is coordinated solely by the adoptive parents and 
the birth parent, or a representative of these parties, and is completely 
autonomous from any agency involvement. Representatives might be 
attorneys, social workers, clergy, or even medical personnel. Most often, 
birth mothers participating in the process of independent adoption are 
seeking to form an adoption plan for an unborn child.43 Alternatively, 
prospective birth parents might be using nonagency means to search for 
children, most notably through adoption advertisements or a party who is 
likely to know of mothers contemplating placing a child in adoption. 
Due to the lack of agency-imposed safeguards against fraud, and the lack 
of intensive screening processes and parent counseling, independent 
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adoption is prohibited in several states.44 Safeguards still exist in those 
states that allow independent adoption, most notably the requirement of a 
home study during which a social worker determines the prospective 
parents’ suitability to adopt. However, this process is not as rigorous as the 
screening process that would be conducted by an agency. 
Another possible policy justification for disallowing independent 
adoption is its supposed proximity to black-market adoption, leading many 
observers to refer to independent adoption as “the grey market.”45 In black-
market adoptions, “baby brokers” connect adoptive parents with birth 
mothers for direct profit. In a black-market adoption, birth mothers can 
potentially profit by receiving money in excess of the compensation 
permitted by state law. Also, adoptive parents do not have to endure years-
long waiting periods, nor are they subjected to an agency screening process. 
The only difference, hypothetically, between an independent adoption and a 
black-market adoption is the exchange of money that is expressly prohibited 
by state law. However, black-market adoptions might also utilize forged or 
fabricated versions of the necessary documents, such as home study reports. 
While this type of adoption is rare in the United States, it still persists due to 
its level of discreetness and the obvious financial benefits it affords to 
unscrupulous birth parents and baby brokers. 
Still, the differences between independent adoption and black-market 
adoption are not necessarily as vague as dissenters might portray. Ideally, 
an independent adoption only differs from an agency adoption in that the 
screening process is conducted by a state social worker rather than the state-
sponsored agency representative. All other matters are conducted with the 
same transparency and rigor as an agency adoption. As discussed later, this 
transparency is enforced by laws in several states in the form of mandatory 
disclosure of all adoption related expenses, along with close state 
supervision of the parties’ financial transactions. 
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4. Open Adoption 
Open adoption is a relatively new variation of agency adoption that is 
gaining in popularity and it is worth mentioning for its potential to increase 
the supply of adoptees. In open adoption, prospective parents submit their 
information to an agency. Birth parents who contact the agency are given 
access to the various profiles of prospective parents. The birth parents select 
several of the profiles, and the agency arranges meetings. The birth 
parent(s) ultimately select the parent(s) with whom the child will be placed. 
Additionally, the birth parents can negotiate a mutually agreeable level of 
involvement in the child’s life after his or her birth, not unlike the visitation 
arrangements of a divorce. 
In theory, open adoption affords all parties advantages over traditional 
“closed” adoption. The birth mother is spared some of the burden of 
abandoning a child by being able to approve of the child’s new parents and 
guarantee some involvement in and knowledge about the child’s future life. 
The child benefits by growing up with knowledge of her origins and by 
having a relationship with her biological parents while still having a 
permanent and stable parental relationship with her adoptive parents. The 
adoptive parents might benefit as well by relieving themselves of the 
possible future stress of a resentful or restless adoptive child, one who feels 
alienated from his or her genealogical identity. Ultimately, open adoption 
could function as a means to increase the attractiveness of adoption for 
single mothers or other disadvantaged parents who might otherwise keep 
their children due to the trauma and uncertainty of giving a child up for 
adoption, or who might abort the pregnancy out of these same fears. 
Having discussed the three major forms of adoption, this article can now 
address the economic and social theorists’ positions on the adoption market. 
Because adoption involves moral questions on the value of human life in 
the context of a human exchange, theorists have taken different positions on 
how to deal with the market forces at play in the adoption industry. This 
next section will address two of the most prominent views posed by such 
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observers and commentators, namely the free market of personhood models 
of adoption. The section will then conclude by discussing the emergence of 
a third view, the poststructuralist view, and its potential to bridge the free 
market and personhood models. 
II. SCHOLARLY VIEWPOINTS OF MARKET FORCES IN ADOPTION 
Several legal theorists have addressed the market forces in adoption and 
their effects on children, families, society, and the adoption process itself. 
These theorists tend to occupy one of two views. One view advocates “free 
market” adoption, which typically involves the removal of barriers on 
adoption payments to birth mothers or other regulation of monetary 
exchanges in adoption procedures. This viewpoint is best described by 
Judge Richard Posner, one of the founders of the law-and-economics 
movement of the last half-century. 
In opposition to this viewpoint are theorists who have challenged the 
“commodification” of adoptees. The commodification of human products, 
such as sperm, eggs, and organs, has attracted much attention from 
observers who question the fungibility of these items and who warn that 
these markets are immoral, if not outright dangerous to those individuals 
involved in these markets. Therefore, the law should be hypercritical of 
these markets, and necessary measures should be made to protect the 
personhood of individuals. The market forces at play in adoption are of 
special interest to these personhood advocates because adoptees are 
simultaneously both individuals and the biological product of their birth 
parents. Professor Margaret Radin best represents this “personhood” ideal 
and has delivered much of its rhetoric on the topic of adoption. This section 
will outline these two competing and responsive theories of adoption 
market forces, relying on Posner and Radin for the key tenets. 
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A. Free-Market Adoption 
In 1978, while a Professor of Law at the University of Chicago, Judge 
Posner—a key proponent of “Law-and-Economics” theory—proposed a 
reanalysis of the law’s view of the adoption market.46 Posner developed a 
model of supply and demand in the adoption process, one built around a 
system of regulation and social forces that does not differ drastically from 
those presently at play. By that point in time, as is true today, adoption 
agencies—both public and private—had grown to dominate over 
independent adoption.47 The restrictions on payments to birth parents were 
nationwide by this point, meaning that most states limited a child’s “price” 
to the direct medical expenses and, at most, some maintenance expenses for 
the end of the pregnancy.48 
Posner cited several similarities between adoption regulations and those 
seen in “explicit markets,” including the monopolization by government-
sponsored institutions and the hindrance on full pricing.49 However, 
adoption did have several distinct characteristics: the collusion seen 
between agencies, the agencies’ inability to refuse the children offered to 
them, and the availability of a close, unregulated substitute to the 
agencies—namely, independent adoption.50 Estimating the potential 
demand for adoption by comparing the percentage of childless couples with 
the percentage of young women who had indicated their expectation to 
remain childless,51 Posner noted a surprising lack of utilization of 
independent adoption.52 This he attributed to the restriction on fees, which 
artificially decreased the financial value of children.53 Hence, not only were 
fewer children being put into adoption, the market was providing children at 
an underappreciated cost, and the limited supply was therefore disappearing 
at a much quicker rate.54 
Posner’s main issue with restricted independent adoption fees was that 
the fees did not represent the birth mother’s true expenses for the pregnancy 
and the subsequent adoption. While most systems did allow for 
compensation for medical and legal services and for some living expenses, 
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other costs were beyond compensation. Posner listed three chief costs that 
were undercompensated: (1) the opportunity costs of the birth mother 
during her pregnancy, over and above her living expenses; (2) both the 
physical and emotional suffering experienced as a result of the pregnancy 
and adoption; and (3) the costs of locating the middlemen who would 
connect the birth mother and the adoptive parents.55 While this last category 
of cost is minor, it still represents a crucial obstacle to market-efficient 
adoption. Although permissible costs can be slightly inflated due to the lack 
of scrutiny, the unavailability of fully legitimate payments to middlemen 
results in the duty of connecting birth mothers with adoptive parents to fall 
on those people who are already committed to the adoption process, either 
financially or not: attorneys, obstetricians, or the birth mothers 
themselves.56 With full legal compensation, middlemen could more 
effectively connect birth parents with adoptive parents—an attractive idea 
in a market where these persons might be socially and geographically 
removed from one another and who likely lack experience in the adoption 
process.57 
Along with more efficient and professional placement of children, the 
expansion of payments in independent adoption would affect other desirable 
results. In the adoption process, both now and in 1978, birth mothers have 
had little financial incentive to give a child up for adoption rather than abort 
their pregnancies.58 Also, public assistance might often be available to cover 
the medical expenses that adoption would otherwise cover, so birth mothers 
might feasibly be less inclined to opt for adoption if they are already 
incurring the same opportunity costs by raising the child.59 A free 
independent market would more fully compensate women for the physical, 
emotional, and economic consequences of their pregnancy. Therefore, this 
system would also reduce any incentive to seek compensation in the black 
market.60 Lastly, the constraints on independent adoption payments may be 
responsible for the number of children in foster care, because birth mothers 
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who already intend to relinquish their parental rights have no financial 
incentive to place a child in adoption.61 
This last argument, while contentious, certainly seems intuitive. It also 
could contain more implications for the adoption supply than Posner 
intended. With an increased incentive comes a more frequent termination of 
birth parental rights. Some birth parents, whose parental rights might not 
have otherwise been terminated, might voluntarily terminate their parental 
rights in order to receive compensation. In addition, some birth parents 
whose rights would still have been terminated might expedite the process, 
therefore accelerating the child’s placement. While some birth parents 
might actually withhold termination until adoptive parents willing to 
compensate were located, the essential argument persists that with more 
incentive to adopt comes more effort to make adoption happen. 
In response to anticipated arguments against free-market adoption, 
Posner recognized that the assignment of children by price was not designed 
to promote the best interests of children.62 However, Posner argued, agency 
adoption did not act exclusively in the children’s best interests, because (1) 
parents were not categorized by parental fitness once the state determined 
their qualifications to adopt, and (2) the particular best interests of the 
children were rarely discernible at their young age.63 Therefore, as long as 
states still screened independent adoption parents by the same standards as 
agencies, the same level of safeguards against abuse would exist.64 
Posner challenged several other anticipated criticisms, but one possible 
rebuttal was not addressed. With pregnancy being theoretically a cost-
neutral activity, any slight increase of a birth mother’s entitlement to costs 
might allow reproduction to become profitable. Posner already suggests that 
regulated grey-market payments are prone to semi-fraudulent inflation.65 
However, he does not present any method which might prevent free-market 
adoption from experiencing the same semi-fraud. Most likely, he would 
treat this circumstance as an inevitable and unfortunate, but ultimately 
inconsequential, outcome of this preferable system. 
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Posner has since backed away somewhat from his original position on 
this subject, recognizing that the threat of child abusers and the potential 
influence of eugenics into such a market form serious obstacles to free-
market adoption.66 Still, according to Posner, the free market should be 
considered for its desirable effects of reducing abortions, providing an 
alternative to black-market adoption, and relieving the severe demand 
problem in lawful adoption.67 
B. Personhood Model 
Opposite Posner’s free-market version of adoption is Professor Margaret 
Radin’s protest against the commodification of personhood interests.68 
Radin—who analyzes the markets for such concepts as genetic material, 
organs, and sexual intercourse—includes adoption in her spectrum of 
markets whose commodification threatens the personhood of individuals 
and the sanctity of individual rights. Her challenge to this (perceived) 
universal commodification of ideas tied to personhood places emphasis on 
both the literal and rhetorical markets revolving around these subjects.69 As 
an example of the role market rhetoric plays in contested commodities, 
Radin uses Posner’s 1978 article by emphasizing his monetary qualification 
of human interaction.70 However, Posner is not alone, as Radin points out, 
in his financial perception of humanity: even Hobbes conceived of a 
person’s needs, values, and desires in terms of price.71 
The danger in this model of thinking, Radin argues, is that the 
objectification of a person’s attributes to his or her personhood dangerously 
erodes his or her individual autonomy.72 While the commodification of 
human commodities does not necessarily equate to slavery, the effect is 
similar:  
[P]ersons . . . possess objects that they may control or 
manipulate to achieve their ends. Objectification is improper 
treatment of persons because it makes them means, not ends. As 
means, objects may be bought and sold in markets, to achieve 
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satisfaction of persons’ needs and desires. Objects, but not persons, 
may be commodified.73  
This threat is doubly true in adoption, which objectifies not only the child 
itself, but also the reproductive abilities of the birth parents.74 
In addition to objectification, the subordination of persons is an effect of 
these contested markets.75 Radin defined wrongful subordination as the 
“unjustified dominance or exercise of power by one person or group over 
another.”76 Subordination could be viewed as a side-effect of 
objectification, such as when certain characteristics of a person are viewed 
as inferior or superior to those of others.77 Hence, the marketability of 
human attributes—either through a direct market or through market 
rhetoric—has the initial effect of objectification, which leads to 
subordination. In short, putting quantifiable values on persons based on 
their most immediate characteristics would enforce social hierarchy. 
Adoption potentially facilitates a particularly invasive form of 
subordination. When a baby or child is objectified, all of its attributes—sex, 
race, hair color, predicted intelligence, predicted height—become part of its 
“worth.”78 In both a literal and a rhetorical market, therefore, there exist 
inferior and superior children. These categories of worth are based on 
demographics, such as race and gender, which reinforce stigmas that society 
might otherwise find offensive, or at least distasteful. This leads those who 
observe these commodified adoptions to base their own self-worth in terms 
of the adoption market.79 This might be true not just for those individuals 
who participate in the adoptions, but also for anyone on the periphery who 
becomes aware of the price of the adoption and how that price differs based 
on a child’s characteristics.80 Posner himself was concerned about the 
implications of an open market in which prices for babies were racially 
stratified; unable to offer a solution, he admitted that his model could 
potentially exacerbate racial tensions.81 
Radin speaks of this kind of pervasiveness as the “domino effect” of 
commodification. Under this theory, the existence of a commodified version 
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(such as prostitution) of a personhood interest (sexual intercourse, in this 
example) will contaminate the entire interest such that all versions can be 
spoken of in the market rhetoric of the commodified version.82 The domino 
theory has great application in the adoption market, where people will not 
only view other parent-child relationships in market terms, but will view all 
children—and even themselves—in terms of their marketable attributes. 
Furthermore, if the commodification of persons at birth is permissible, then 
the commodification of persons at other points in their lives is less 
objectionable. 
Radin does not actually believe that a free market for children would be a 
slippery slope to permissible slavery, but does argue that the social 
permissibility of adoption is due to the lack of a free market.83 It is the two-
part selflessness of adoption—of parting with one’s child while another 
person accepts the child as his or her own—that distinguishes adoption from 
slavery; the positive perception that this selflessness creates is what makes 
adoption not only palatable to society but even noble.84 The relinquishment 
of a child is typically viewed as admirable, since there is the presumption 
that it is being done for the child’s best interests. Once the prospect of 
monetary gain appears, this sense of altruism might disappear.85 The death 
of altruism is another common theme in Radin’s view of universal 
commodification, and it plays an important role in the domino theory.86 
Even if the complete commodification of children did not lead to the 
erosion of adoption as a socially permissible practice, it might still have the 
effect of nullifying the majority of adoption’s social importance and 
prestige. Adoption would be viewed as less honorable, for both the birth 
mother and the adoptive parents. Communities would be denied these 
examples of selflessness, and adopted children would suffer both by 
viewing themselves as commodities and by being perceived as 
commodities. 
Taking all of these possibilities into account, Radin ultimately questions 
whether even the partial commodification of children via adoption could 
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truly lead to the results she fears.87 Even if people come to view themselves 
according to the values of the adoption market, this does not preclude them 
from still retaining a noncommercial view of themselves.88 In addition, the 
domino theory assumes that we cannot know the price of something and 
still view it as priceless.89 Of course, there is no guarantee that the 
commodification of adoption would rob it of its social worth. 
While Radin’s view certainly gives a broader scope to the dynamics of 
adoption and its effects on the social fabric, its commitment to the 
preservation of personhood often leads it to overlook or dismiss the social 
benefits of present-day adoption. Adoptions tainted by objectification and 
subordination might still represent a superior result to any feasible 
alternative. The aspiration of removing all objectification and subordination 
from adoption is not only unrealistic, it also ignores the social wealth 
created by timely and well-executed traditional adoptions. 
C. Poststructuralist View  
While the detriments of a legal free market for adoption severely 
outweigh its benefits, the free market does pose a solution to the adoption 
crunch. However, the threats of objectification, subordination, and the loss 
of altruism prevent the serious consideration of Posner’s proposal. 
Some synthesis of Posner’s free-market adoption with that of Radin’s 
personhood model has been suggested.90 While both Radin and Posner’s 
approaches have been designated as overly unitary and uncompromising,91 a 
poststructuralist view of commodification would allow for market 
mechanisms to empower marginalized people who circumvent traditional 
reproduction.92 This viewpoint perceives the introduction of economics into 
intimate relationships as noncontradictory, and often as an acceptable 
validation of relationships.93 The ability to commodify something does not 
necessarily lead to commodification; instead, markets should be channeled 
to serve the single goal of enhancing human benefit.94 
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This poststructuralist view is of great use, allowing observers of adoption 
to speak of adoption in market rhetoric with the express interest of 
improving social wealth. Given Radin’s own doubts about the danger of 
commodification in adoption, this article will proceed to evaluate the 
adoption process in its market terms, with the view that other market-
conscious action besides free-market adoption can be taken without 
critically endangering personhood and adoption as a worthwhile social 
enterprise. 
III. PAST AND ONGOING MEASURES 
This article will next explore past and proposed measures that have 
affected—or seek to affect—the adoption crunch. Although no past 
measures have expressly confronted the market forces in adoption, some 
measures have affected the market behavior of adoption and effectively 
achieved some of the benefits Posner sought to affect via free-market 
adoption while (in some instances) mitigating the fears posed by Radin. 
These measures can be organized into three categories: those designed to 
promote welfare adoption, those designed to curb black-market adoption, 
and those designed to dissuade grey-market adoption. 
A. The Uniform Adoption Act 
The first attempt at establishing a uniform set of adoption laws across 
states was made in 1953, when the National Conference of Commissioners 
on Uniform State Laws published its Uniform Adoption Act (UAA).95 Not 
until the act was revised in 1969 did any state ratify the Act.96 The Act was 
again ratified in 1994, to which only Vermont signed.97 
In both the 1969 and 1994 versions, the UAA requires that adoptive 
parents report their expenditures related to their adoption, including any 
services related to such placement.98 Prior to a final adoption hearing, the 
adoptive parents must file an account of any payment or exchange made on 
their behalf in connection with the adoption. This account must include the 
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date and amount of each payment, along with a statement as to its purpose. 
Any lawyers involved in the adoption—whether they represent the adoptive 
parents, the child, or the birth parents—must make a similar account of any 
payments received in connection with the adoption. Depending on whether 
the adoption was independent or not, any agency or guardian must do the 
same. The UAA encourages that accounting be as exact as possible, and to 
include the identity of any person or entity involved in the handling of 
adoption expenses.99 
The UAA specifies both lawful and unlawful payments.100 For example, 
the UAA forbids the exchange of money or any items of value for the 
express placement of a minor for adoption. The UAA also explicitly forbids 
any payment for the birth parents’ consent or relinquishment. However, the 
act does allow payment to agencies for their services in connection with the 
adoption, including those incurred in locating the child—such as advertising 
costs. More importantly, it allows for several categories of compensation to 
the birth parents: (1) the medical, pharmaceutical, and traveling expenses 
incurred by the birth mother in connection with the birth (or any illness to 
the child); (2) any counseling services for the parent(s) for a reasonable time 
before or after the adoption placement; (3) living expenses for the mother 
within a reasonable time before the birth and for no more than six weeks 
after the birth; and (4) any legal costs incurred by the birth parents. 
In addition, the UAA gives a framework for the fees and compensation 
that an agency may demand.101 The agency may charge the adoptive parents 
for any of its own legal services made in connection with an adoption, along 
with costs relating to preplacement evaluations and background checks. 
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the agency may charge a percentage 
of the agency’s annual expenses relating to locating and counseling the birth 
parents, the adoptees, and the adoptive parents; however, no guidelines are 
given as to determining this percentage. 
The UAA, whose existence predates both Posner’s and Radin’s work, 
presents a middle ground between a deregulated model of free-market 
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adoption and a system devoted to personhood interests as described by 
Radin. Both Posner and the UAA strived to make adoption a cost-neutral 
process for the birth mother; first, by advocating for compensation for 
counseling and then by allowing the reasonable living expenses of the birth 
mother to be passed on to the adoptive family. However, the UAA differs in 
an important fashion from the payment structure proposed by Posner. First, 
any compensation for the birth mother’s physical and emotional suffering is 
limited to the actual cost of treatment; there is no compensation for 
enduring the pregnancy and birth. Second, there is no compensation for the 
birth mother’s opportunity costs over and above her living expenses. 
Therefore, the child cannot be exchanged for the value of her next best 
financial opportunity, most likely the employment that she missed out on 
due to her pregnancy. Because of these two differences in permissible 
payments, the UAA represents a nonprofitable alternative to the free-market 
model. 
Because of this lack of profitability, the UAA retreats from the 
heightened form of commodification that Posner’s model presented. 
Additionally, it preserves much of the altruism undertaken by birth mothers 
by maintaining their “volunteer” status in giving a child up for adoption. 
However, cost-neutralizing payments—even those limited to actual costs—
still treat the birth mother as the means to an end. Additionally, the 
exchange of any payments between the birth mother and the adoptive 
parents creates a quid pro quo relationship that implies a compensatory 
scheme that rewards the birth mother for her genetic attributes. Assuming 
that some women cannot locate adoptive parents willing to provide payment 
for their pregnancy leading to adoption, the UAA still objectifies and 
subordinates adoptees and their birth mothers. 
B. Baby Broker Acts 
“Black-market” adoption has been a topic of concern for American 
legislatures since at least the 1950s.102 In order to expressly tackle the issue 
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of black-market adoption, multiple jurisdictions enacted “baby broker acts,” 
which penalize, by some mix of civil or criminal sanctions, the adoption of 
a child through unlicensed means.103 Typically, these acts prevent the 
reception of money in exchange for arranging an adoption or for placing a 
child for adoption.104 The important distinction to make between any illicit 
payments that these acts prohibit and the permissible payments made to 
lawyers, birth mothers, and agencies is that the permissible payments are 
viewed as a reimbursement for costs or services related to the adoption. 
Payments become illegal when they no longer pertain to these two 
categories and instead are intended as profit for the child itself. Predictably, 
considerable confusion has arisen trying to distinguish between lawful and 
unlawful payments.105 This distinction becomes crucial in jurisdictions 
which follow the UAA’s recommendation of requiring judicial approval of 
all adoption expenses; in these jurisdictions, the unwitting inclusion of an 
improper payment can result in the refusal of the adoption petition.106 Due 
to this and other consequences caused by uncertainty, a call has arisen for 
more definite direction as to permissible payments in independent 
adoption.107 
In addition, the enforcement of baby broker acts has been hindered by the 
difficulty of distinguishing between illegal payments and permissible 
monetary benefits made to the child.108 Some courts have interpreted the 
permissibility of reimbursement for a birth mother’s medical expenses as 
inconsistent with a prohibition on reimbursement for other expenses 
incurred but unpaid and have accordingly expanded the scope of 
permissible payments.109 Essentially, this view of payment seems to 
embrace, at least somewhat, the broader vision of adoption reimbursement 
proposed by Posner. 
Lastly, baby broker acts have encountered vagueness issues, with several 
courts finding that these statutes are overbroad and do not give sufficient 
certainty as to the prohibited behavior.110 In Illinois v. Schwartz, a state 
district court found that the Illinois baby broker act, which forbade any 
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compensation for “placing out,” was unconstitutional by virtue of being 
vague, uncertain, and overbroad.111 The defendant was prosecuted for 
placing an adoption-eligible child with his clients, but the district court 
found that the statute’s definition of “placing out” was so obscure that it 
failed to set forth constitutionally sufficient standards of conduct.112 On 
appeal, the state supreme court found that the statute was in fact definite 
enough to inform attorneys of permissible and impermissible behavior.113 
Specifically, the statute provided that only a child welfare agency could 
request or receive compensation for the placement of children.114 Therefore, 
the statute, when applied to an attorney, would not infringe upon his or her 
ability to perform legal services; it merely established that an attorney could 
not act as a paid intermediary or placement agent for a party desiring to buy 
or sell a child, the same as any other individual.115 
While Posner took express measures to explain how his model would not 
allow for black-market adoptions, his free-market model would not likely 
be consistent with any active baby broker act. This is because of the 
difficulties that would likely arise in seeking payments for “middlemen” in 
independent adoption—agents whose sole function in the adoption process 
would be to connect birth mothers and adoptive parents. Such “middlemen” 
would likely function as the “baby brokers” that such measures were 
designed to eliminate. While agencies fulfill this function in most forms of 
adoption, in independent adoption this role usually falls on lawyers, doctors, 
or the birth parents themselves. Posner adamantly argued in favor of the 
permissible function for independent middlemen in order to provide 
efficiency in a dispersed and nuanced market. However, since such 
middlemen would not be providing any function autonomous from the 
adoption placement (such as legal advice or medical service), they could 
reasonably be judged to be profiting solely off the child. Therefore, they 
would likely be in violation of most (if not all) baby broker acts. This result 
might be avoided if middlemen were to provide some additional or nominal 
service—such as adoption counseling or advertisement. However, due to 
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the vague language and conceptions surrounding impermissible payment, 
there is no guarantee that a court might not interpret such a function as 
being equivalent to an adoption agent charging a commission for a 
successful sale and hence profiting off the adoption. There is no indication 
that Posner held a different view of these agents. 
Radin, perhaps ironically, might agree with courts that have found the 
permissibility of medical expenses to be inconsistent with a prohibition on 
other expenses. However, while the judicial response has been to expand 
the scope of permissible payments,116 Radin’s proposal would almost 
certainly be to reduce—or even remove—the spectrum of legal payment. 
Even without resorting to a slippery-slope domino theory of 
commodification, the use of one set of justified payments in independent 
adoption would still create a subtext of objectification and subordination. It 
might then seem arbitrary to disallow another set of payments because of a 
lack of service or costs traditionally associated with adoption. 
In defense of baby broker acts, Radin could point to their preservation of 
society’s perception of altruism in adoption. Without such measures, the 
existence of for-profit adoption and baby brokers could create a social 
backlash against adoption. This disfavor might be limited to independent 
adoption, but the presence of a market for adoptees might jeopardize the 
entire concept. Baby broker acts therefore ensure that all adoption payments 
are made in pursuit of the adoptee’s best interests. 
C. Expansion of Categories of Potential Parents 
As already discussed, states have been allowing different categories of 
applicants for adoption. While this allowance might increase the demand for 
adoptive children by increasing the supply of potential adoptive parents, it 
might also increase the adoption rates for foster children and other less in-
demand adoptees. 
One proposed solution to the lack of interest in foster care adoption has 
been the use of joint adoption between two single persons who are not 
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married or otherwise romantically involved.117 In such an adoption, two 
platonic individuals, whether cohabitating or living separately, would both 
be declared parents of a child and would share parental duties under their 
own informal structure. This departure from the traditional vision of nuclear 
family is in keeping with the expansion of categories of potential adoptive 
parents.118 However, even though most state statutes do not expressly 
prohibit two persons who are not romantically involved from adopting, 
courts still adhere to the vision of co-parents sharing some similarity to a 
traditional family unit.119 
This proposal is additionally unique in the fact that it is targeted 
specifically at providing greater adoption opportunities for hard-to-place 
children, who otherwise might never locate a set of parents to provide a 
family atmosphere.120 In particular, this proposal seeks to increase the 
number of adoptive parents for African American children, under the theory 
that present categories of adoptive parents do not adequately fit the African 
American community.121 African American children are disproportionately 
represented in foster care, and the prospect of single parenting—while 
burdensome for even a prosperous individual—may be particularly 
problematic for African Americans due to the economic barriers facing this 
demographic.122 The need to encourage adoption within the African 
American community has been a topic for over a quarter-century, due to the 
issue of interracial adoption and the placement of African American 
children with white adoptive parents.123 In 1994, the National Association 
of Black Social Workers called for the removal of barriers to intra-racial 
adoption.124 
As mentioned earlier, the adoption avenues for gay and lesbian 
prospective parents are widening. This change in adoption practices has 
taken a variety of forms. Gay and lesbian adoption not only includes the 
adoption of a child by a homosexual couple, but also the second-parent 
adoption by a homosexual partner of a biological parent. Additionally, there 
is a growing acceptance of adoption by openly gay single individuals who 
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previously might have needed to conceal their homosexuality in order to 
qualify as a prospective parent.125 Currently, these developments represent 
one of the most heated areas of discussion and concern in adoption. State 
courts and legislatures are rapidly confronting difficult issues surrounding 
same-sex adoption, often because of vague statutory language, 
constitutional equal protection issues, or a lack of precedent.126 While this 
category of potential parents is currently in a great amount of fluctuation, 
what seems certain is that homosexual individuals are going to represent a 
larger percentage of adoptive parents in this century than in the last. 
The expansion of adoption by means of increasing adoption by African 
American and same-sex parents presents a mostly positive outcome for the 
preservation of personhood and altruism in adoption. This expansion of 
adoption could potentially relieve much of the strain on the foster care 
system by increasing the supply of parents interested in special-needs 
adoption. The adoption of a special-needs child by a nontraditional family 
would likely be viewed as a perfectly selfless act. It could also be viewed as 
an epitome of social wealth maximization—even a kind of synergy. An 
otherwise unadopted child is given a familial home, the state is relieved of 
providing for one more foster child, and minorities—both in a communal 
and individual sense—are given access to a social institution that they 
otherwise could not take part in.127 
Also, by increasing the involvement of under-represented categories of 
adoptive parents, these measures could also help relieve the objectification 
and subordination that Radin viewed as widespread in traditional adoption. 
Increased minority participation in adoption will counteract the perception 
of adoption as being a mainly Caucasian institution and provide a less 
overall biased market in independent or agency adoption. And any increase 
in foster care adoption is beneficial for personhood interests, since—on the 
whole—these adoptions are likely lacking in any objectification of the child 
according to preferred physical and genetic features. 
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D. Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act 
The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act (AACWA), passed by 
Congress in 1980, was an effort to provide financial incentives to any state 
that maintained a financial assistance program to promote the adoption of 
special-needs children.128 It was expressly intended to enable families to 
provide permanent care to children who otherwise would likely spend their 
entire childhood in foster care.129 Due to the sometimes prohibitive costs of 
adopting a child with physical or psychological disabilities, some guardians 
might be persuaded to remain foster parents due to the subsidies provided 
by state social services. Under AACWA, however, this consideration would 
be neutralized, and foster parents would feasibly be more inclined to form a 
permanent parent-child relationship via adoption.130   
However, AACWA went beyond simply removing barriers to the 
adoption of the physically and mentally handicapped. It applied a very 
broad definition of a “special-needs child”: one which included age, ethnic 
background, or any other factor that would reasonably prevent adoptive 
placement.131 Because it did not limit its definition of special needs to those 
situations which would inherently include extra financial burden, AACWA 
had the additional function of promoting foster adoption overall. This policy 
became explicit in subsequent amendments, and the portion of the act 
authorizing the adoption incentive program is now known as the Adoption 
Promotion Act of 2003.132 Other federal law requires states to actively 
promote adoption assistance for children in foster care placements.133 To 
qualify for federal funds, states must reimburse adoptive parents for any 
nonrecurring expenses and Medicaid coverage.134 The statute dictates that 
“nonrecurring adoption expenses” include reasonable adoption fees, court 
costs and attorney fees.135 Other expenses directly related to legal adoption, 
such as health and home examination fees or transportation costs, may also 
be compensated.136 
However broad its definition of special needs, the AACWA still limits its 
incentives based on the financial status of the child. While states are 
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allowed to show discretion as to the design of their adoption support 
programs, they must still meet the Act’s eligibility requirements. In addition 
to being a special-needs child, the child must either be (1) eligible for Aid 
for Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), (2) eligible for 
Supplemental Security Income (SSI), or (3) the child of a minor in foster 
care.137 AFDC, reformed into Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 
(TANF) in 1997, is a monthly cash benefit for families who fall below the 
poverty line; the child is considered eligible if the family from which he or 
she was removed would have qualified for this support.138 SSI has a 
somewhat higher income eligibility requirement, but the child must be 
disabled.139 It is significant that while these requirements restrict the 
availability of AACWA funds based on the financial circumstances from 
which the child came from, accessibility is not restricted by the means of 
the adoptive parents; the consideration of the economic standing of the 
adoptive parents is forbidden by federal law.140 
Other restrictions on the dissemination of AACWA subsidies remain. 
One is the requirement that a reasonable, but unsuccessful, attempt be made 
to place special-needs children without triggering the Act’s financial 
assistance.141 The only exception for this requirement is when, because of a 
significant emotional tie with foster parents now attempting to adopt, the 
child’s best interests would dictate that he or she remain in this relationship 
rather than be placed elsewhere.142 If the child’s foster caregivers establish 
that they would be unable to adopt without a subsidy, this requirement 
would be met.143 Otherwise, the child’s caseworker must establish that an 
effort was made to place the child without assistance; this requirement can 
be met by submitting the child’s profile to adoption agencies or 
exchanges.144 
The other requirement is that “the State has determined that the child 
cannot or should not be returned to the home of his parents.”145 Usually, this 
requirement is satisfied by a court order terminating the original parental 
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rights. However, the filing of a petition for termination or voluntary 
relinquishment can suffice.146 
While the AACWA represents an admirable attempt at removing the 
financial barriers of special-needs adoption and providing financial 
incentives for foster care adoption, its limitations hinder its ability to truly 
influence market behavior and provide a full-fledged push for foster care 
adoption. 
E. Adoption and Safe Families Act 
In 1997, Congress enacted the Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA), 
which was hailed as the “most sweeping chang[e] to the nation’s adoption 
and foster care system in nearly two decades.”147 The bill had two major co-
functions: (1) to move children quickly from foster care to adoption, and (2) 
to shift the interest of foster care from “reunification with birth parents” to 
“best interests of the child.”148 The ASFA was intended to improve the 
policies embodied in AACWA, largely by amending the reasonable efforts 
to preserve original parental rights.149 
The primary step toward accomplishing this goal was to expedite the 
termination of parental rights when: (1) a parent had subjected the child to 
“aggravated circumstances,” (2) the parent had committed certain criminal 
acts, or (3) parental rights had already been involuntarily terminated for a 
sibling.150 Absent any of these circumstances, the law then mandated the 
filing of a petition for termination of parental rights within specified time 
constraints, usually within fifteen months of a child entering foster care.151 
The only exceptions to the termination petition were if (1) the child was 
in the care of a relative, (2) the state agency determined that termination 
was not in the child’s best interests, or (3) when the parents had not been 
given access to social services that could potentially result in 
reunification.152 State agencies were required to develop reasonable 
placement strategies for each individual foster child, regardless of the 
child’s situation, in order to encourage quick placement into a permanent 
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living situation.153 States were also encouraged to enter into interstate 
compacts to facilitate adoption and protect the interests of the adopted child 
with regard to adoption assistance. 
Congress strengthened the ASFA’s ability to promote foster care 
adoption by offering federal funds to states that were able to increase 
placement of foster care adoptees, especially older and disabled children.154 
Under the incentive program, states would be credited $4,000 for each 
foster care adoption in excess of the previous fiscal year, with an additional 
$2,000 for each additional special-needs foster adoption.155 
State courts began using ASFA as evidence of a federal interest to 
expedite the termination of all parental rights rather than prolong efforts to 
unify or repair broken and abusive families. Specifically, they concluded 
that previous policies promoting family reunification conflicted with the 
ASFA, and birth parents were no longer afforded an unlimited period of 
time to address and resolve negligence or abuse issues.156 Some courts have 
gone further, and found that the ASFA’s focus on child safety and its 
mandate for quick and permanent placement effectively precluded state 
agencies from working aggressively toward reunifying the child with its 
family if returning the child is not appropriate.157 Courts have even 
interpreted the ASFA to give foster children an enforceable federal statutory 
right to have a state initiate termination of parental rights proceedings when 
they have been in foster care for the necessary fifteen months; children can 
also demand that states attempt to identify, recruit, and approve a qualified 
family for their adoption.158 Several courts even interpreted the ASFA to 
apply retroactively, so that children who had entered foster care prior to 
state ratification or compliance with the ASFA would nonetheless have 
their relationship evaluated and processed according to the act’s 
provisions.159 While some states have found the fifteen-month limitation on 
reunification unconstitutional,160 others have found that the act still 
preserves a parent’s rights regardless of the time limits involved.161 
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With little doubt, the ASFA has been responsible for an increase in foster 
care adoption. Even after the enactment of the AACWA, the foster care 
adoption rate remained roughly fixed between 17,000 and 21,000 annual 
adoptions—about 10 percent of the national foster child population.162 By 
2000, the number had risen to 46,000; in 2002, 53,000 foster care adoptions 
took place.163 This increase demonstrates not only the potential success of 
state incentives to adoption, but it also suggests that the potential demand 
for foster adoption is not limited to the traditional placement figures.164 The 
ASFA also provides an excellent example of the influence legislation can 
have upon “market behavior.” 
However, this increase in foster adoption might not have offset the 
increase in children whose relationships with their birth parents have been 
severed as a result of the ASFA.165 Even by 2000, federal data indicated that 
ASFA had expanded the population of children needing adoptive parents, 
which had jumped from 86,000 in 1993 to 117,000 in 1999.166 The biggest 
criticism of the ASFA has almost certainly been its focus on termination of 
parental rights without regard to a child’s real chances for adoption.167 This 
effect has a particular potential for impact on children of color in foster 
care.168 Such children represent a disproportionately large percentage of the 
foster care population, yet substantial barriers still exist for nonwhite 
prospective adoptive parents.169 
Ultimately, the ASFA is the most ambitious example of adoption 
regulation—federal or otherwise—for the purpose of influencing market 
behavior in adoption. It provides incentives for states to encourage foster 
care adoption and removes the boundaries that still exist for potential 
adoptive parents to utilize the subsidies available under the AACWA. 
However, it accomplished these goals by increasing the supply of foster 
care children, arguably at the expense of the birth parents’ parental rights.170 
States, in their eagerness to facilitate the policy goals of the ASFA and to 
gain access to the cumulative federal funds, appear to have overlooked the 
consequences of an increased pool of potential foster adoptees. While an 
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increase in foster care adoption promotes altruism and diminishes the 
objectification of children and birth parents in adoption, under the ASFA, 
these benefits come at the cost of racial and classist subordination. 
Again, as seen in the other measures explored in this article, no benefit in 
adoption law comes without costs. The question of whether these costs are 
acceptable, given the benefits, is beyond the scope of this article. However, 
this article will advocate several measures that confront the market forces at 
work in adoption that, hopefully, can produce benefits that outweigh any 
potential costs. 
IV. PROPOSED REMEDIES 
A. Federalization of Adoption 
While such measures as the Uniform Adoption Act, the Adoption 
Assistance and Child Welfare Act, and the Adoption and Safe Families Act 
have sought in various ways to standardize adoption nationwide, their only 
method of implementation has been via voluntary subscription or financial 
enticement. A true and complete federalization of adoption would offer 
several benefits and would relieve adoption of some of its market-
influenced shortcomings. Differences between states’ adoption statutes 
could potentially deny adoptees protections they might have if they 
remained in their home states. Furthermore, absent some kind of agreement, 
an adoptee’s home state could lose control over the adoption and any 
authority to protect the child’s best interests. 
Aware of these issues, all fifty states and the District of Columbia have 
implemented the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC), 
which was drafted in 1960.171 As part of the ICPC, every state contains an 
office that is part of the department of public welfare or the state’s 
equivalent agency; this office is designated to serve as the central clearing 
point for all referrals for interstate placements.172 The office’s administrator 
and deputies are authorized to conduct the necessary investigation of the 
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proposed placement.173 This process requires that the prospective sending 
party (often an agency) submit a written notice of the proposed placement 
to the ICPC office in the receiving state.174 Notice must also be submitted to 
the sending state’s office.175 The notice must include a social history of the 
child and a case plan. Before placement is finalized, a predetermined child 
welfare agency in the receiving state will conduct a study of the prospective 
adoptive home and then prepare a report on whether or not the placement 
should be made.176 If either state’s office determines that the placement 
cannot or should not be made, the placement will be denied.177 The 
recommended time for this process is at least six weeks.178 
While the ICPC does an admirable job of ensuring that interstate 
adoptees will be provided the same protections and services as if they had 
remained in their home states, the federalization of adoption would remove 
the need for this compact and its respective procedures and offices, thereby 
increasing the efficiency, expediency, and simplicity for interstate 
adoptions. A nationwide adoption act would ensure that the same placement 
standards were being applied across state borders, thus removing the need 
for communication between state offices concerning differing protections 
and definitions for child welfare. 
Most notably, federalization of adoption would prevent the advantageous 
usage of more market-favorable statutes among jurisdictions. Adoptive 
parents seeking independent adoption across state lines are in a position to 
take advantage of less stringent baby broker or adoption payment statutes. 
Currently, the ICPC protects against this kind of forum shopping in agency 
placement.179 However, numerous difficulties arise when applying the ICPC 
in independent adoption, and jurisdictions vary widely on when certain 
situations qualify as an “interstate placement.”180 Under the weightiest 
precedential interpretations of the ICPC, a birth mother is still allowed to 
travel from her home state to the state of the adoptive parents in order to 
complete the adoption free of any constraints in her home state.181 Also, 
there is no penalty for working around interstate safeguards, except for 
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some additional cost and inconvenience, by having adoptive parents 
temporarily live within the birth mother’s home state and finalize the 
adoption there before returning to their separate state.182 
The barriers to true federalization of adoption are formidable, if not 
insurmountable, due to the current constitutional view of federalism and the 
noncommercial perception of adoption. However, an argument could be 
advanced that adoption falls under the Commerce Clause of Article I of the 
U.S. Constitution and therefore can be subject to mandatory federal 
regulation. While interpretation of the Commerce Clause has varied widely 
throughout American history, the current view allows for federal regulation 
of any activity that substantially impacts interstate commerce.183 In light of 
the obvious market forces present in adoption, and the disparity between 
states influencing interstate adoption, one could argue that adoption—
despite its apparent noncommercial nature—still impacts interstate 
commerce to a degree that allows for federal regulation. There are 
numerous barriers to this theory, the most obvious being the traditional 
state-oriented character of adoption and the rights of states to specifically 
monitor the future lives of its children. These concerns are unfortunately too 
immense to be considered further in this article. This article can only 
conclude that true federalization of adoption does not represent a likely 
solution. 
B. Quantitative Cap on Private Agency Adoption Fees 
A more feasible measure, one which will hopefully counteract the 
commodification of adoption while preserving the advantages of agency 
adoption, is a cap or limitation on private agency adoption fees. As 
discussed at the beginning of this article, adoption fees have grown at a 
seemingly exponential rate since they were first introduced in the 1950s. 
A quantitative cap on private agency fees is a variation of a suggestion 
made by Posner, who viewed agency adoption as a state-sponsored semi-
monopoly. Ideally, unlike most monopolies, private agencies would not 
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have the effect of inflating the price of adoption. This would theoretically 
be impermissible due to the regulations limiting agency fees to the average 
actual cost of an adoption. But as several authors point out, agency fees 
have inflated regardless of the adoption costs. Furthermore, as Posner 
suggested, private agencies also represent a possible deterrent to potential 
adoptive parents due to their increased monitoring and “inefficiency” in 
matching and placing adoptees with adoptive parents. Posner’s solution to 
this perceived inefficiency was the promotion of independent adoption. 
However, as a normative view advocated by this article, agency adoption 
should be encouraged over independent adoption. The greater amount of 
oversight and attention paid to the qualities of prospective parents and best 
interests of adoptive children is an essential function that agencies serve. 
Not only does this protect adoptees from potential abuse and exploitation, 
but this level of investigation ensures a positive public perception of 
adoption as a responsibly monitored enterprise. To refer to these measures 
as “inefficient” overlooks not only their inherent necessity but the 
safeguards of personhood that they provide. Although agency adoption is 
still implicit in the commodification of adoption, this avenue of adoption 
has less potential for inflated costs and illicit activity than independent 
adoption. 
As long as money changes hands in the course of adoption, some 
commodification of the process is inevitable. Even as acknowledged by 
Radin, these monetary exchanges are not likely to provide a slippery slope 
to the complete commodification of human interests. Furthermore, adoption 
holds some inherent selflessness and is not endangered by reasonable 
commodification, especially if that commodification occurs under 
regulations that are conscious of their potential effects of objectification and 
subordination. Using a poststructuralist view, this consciousness allows for 
commodification when doing so improves social wealth. Agency adoption 
represents the best compromise between the best interest of the child and 
the inherent market forces of adoption. 
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The desired effect of limiting agency costs is three-fold. The first goal is 
to promote agency adoption by lowering costs. The second goal is to 
decrease the attractiveness of independent adoption, chiefly by reducing the 
costs of agency adoption. An unintended result of the measure could be the 
increased attractiveness of agency adoption as opposed to intercountry 
adoption. This article is unbiased toward intercountry adoption. Again, the 
policy of intercountry adoption and its market forces are outside this 
article’s scope. The third, and most important, goal is to decrease adoption 
as a source of profit, both for the parties and the agencies, in order to protect 
the personhood of the child and to preserve the image of adoption as an 
admirable social institution. 
This proposal carries several possible drawbacks. Chiefly, it could 
potentially drive agencies out of business and decrease the quality and 
effectiveness of professional agents. This is a major concern that could 
undermine all of the measure’s intended goals. A failure of private agency 
adoption could result in more independent adoption and a boost to the gray 
market. Also, putting a cap on private adoption fees might hamper the 
adoption system and drive more adoptions into state agencies, inflating 
foster care numbers and driving up costs to states. 
One measure to prevent this outcome would be a state refund for 
agencies that adhere to a voluntary cap. Alternatively, the cap could remain 
mandatory but be accompanied with a state subsidy for all private adoption 
agencies. Both models would allow agencies to remain near their current 
solvency, while giving them the social impact of a nonprofit agency. 
However, this would effectively remove all incentive to operate a nonprofit 
agency and would be very expensive to states, essentially representing the 
socialization of adoption. 
Another hurdle is that of implementation. For a cap to reach its full 
effect, it must be nationwide. Otherwise, states might be hesitant to adopt 
this measure due to the belief that it would negatively impact the quality of 
private agencies within the state. However, as already discussed, federal 
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implementation would encounter serious constitutional obstacles if made 
mandatory. To work around this limitation, implementation could take the 
same approach as the AACWA and ASFA and provide grants to states that 
adopt this measure. 
Ultimately, all of these possible drawbacks would become moot if the 
measure were successful in promoting agency adoption over other forms of 
private adoption. With or without federal grants, states could still benefit by 
implementing a private agency cap. A single state implementing this cap 
would make it more attractive to out-of-state adoptive parents. While 
agencies might have the incentive to relocate or risk profit loss, they would 
more likely benefit from increased activity, both from out-of-state adoptive 
parents and from parents who might otherwise seek the benefits of 
independent adoption. An industry-wide reduction in price could feasibly 
reduce the attraction of independent adoption for prospective parents, thus 
increasing overall private agency adoption numbers and improving 
profitability for private agencies. 
CONCLUSION 
A cap on private agency adoption is a feasible and desirable step toward 
achieving the benefits of free-market adoption while both preserving the 
personhood of the adoptee and promoting agency adoption as an alternative 
to independent adoption. The measure’s impact on the profitability of 
private adoption agencies should be considered, since the demise of these 
businesses could destroy this avenue of adoption and have the reverse of the 
measure’s intended effects. This result could be prevented either by the 
complete socialization of private agencies by implementing a mandatory 
cap or by the institution of a state grant for agencies that voluntarily adhere 
to the cap. Additionally, adoption of this measure by single states could 
maintain the level of profitability for private agencies without the need for 
state subsidies, provided that the influx of interstate adoption makes up for 
the loss in individual fees. 
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